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I Faith and Knowledge
Whether faith is to be classified as a kind of knowledge or whether these 
are two mutually exclusive categories depends, of course, on how one defines 
each. Certainly faith is a kind of cognition in that it has a noetic content, 
but yet what is held by faith is not immediately and directly seen to be 
true in the way that a self-evident principle or fact of experience can be 
affirmed by the human mind. There are some who interpret St. Augustine 
and the Augustinian tradition as holding that all (or much) of our know­
ledge ultimately rests on faith (not necessarily religious faith) of some 
kind or other. In his essay »The Will to Believe« William James has stressed 
how much of what we hold to be true either is held by faith or depends 
on some antecedent faith. Aquinas (Summa Theologiae Ila-IIae, q. 1, art. 4) 
observes that the intellect can be moved to assent in two ways: first, either 
directly or indirectly by the object itself, in which case we have »science«, 
or knowledge in the strict sense, or secondly, not entirely by the object, 
but by the will, in which case we have faith. In both instances there is 
certitude. William James takes a similar position in his essay »The Will 
to Believe«.
While it cannot be shown that SK had an accurate or more than minimal 
awareness of the Augustinian position, and he knew almost nothing about 
Aquinas, it can be said that SK had a general affinity for the Augustinian 
point of view on faith, despite some critical remarks in the Papirer (cf. XII 
A 237; J&P, I, 180).
However, in Philosophical Fragments SK explicitly denies both that faith 
is a kind of knowledge and that it is an act of the will. Yet in the Con­
cluding Unscientific Postscript (to Philosophical Fragments) he seems to 
say just the opposite: faith is a kind of knowledge, and the will is very 
much involved. There are several reasons for this seeming anomaly. Both
the Fragments and the Postscript are major contributions to SK’s extended 
polemic against Hegel and Hegelianism (cf. KR), and thus much of what 
is said in these two works must be seen in that light. In the Fragments, 
among other things, he is also emphasizing the paradoxical aspect of faith (see 
below). Thus in the Fragments, he says that »this relationship of owing all to 
the Teacher [can] be expressed ... only in that happy passion we call Faith, 
whose object is the Paradox. But the Paradox unites the contradictories, and 
is the historical made eternal, and the Eternal made historical ... It is easy 
to see, though it scarcely needs to be pointed out, since it is involved in 
the fact that the Reason is set aside, that Faith is not a form of knowledge; 
for all knowledge is either a knowledge of the Eternal, excluding the tem­
poral and historical as indifferent, or it is pure historical knowledge. No 
knowledge can have for its object the absurdity that the Eternal is the 
historical.« (6:58; IV, 254; Eng., 76) Kierkegaard’s point here is that by 
itself human reason is incompetent to attain to faith properly so called, 
i.e., the Christian Faith. While SK may not be directly attacking Hegel in 
this passage, the rejection of speculative idealism (including especially 
Hegel), with its confident dialectical resolution of conflicts is evident 
throughout Fragments.
Surely, though, for SK, that which is proper to faith does have a cognitive 
content. But first and last, he emphasizes that what is involved here is not 
ordinary »objective« knowledge. As early as 1835, in the important Gilleleie 
entry, he sees very clearly that the most important »... thing is to find a 
truth which is truth for me, ...« (I A 75; J & P, V, 5100). And so, although 
SK would not agree with Aquinas that the assent of faith carries total 
certainty with it, still for SK, what is affirmed in faith is held to be true.
In fact, SK explicitly identifies subjective truth and faith. For example, 
in Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846) he repeats the theme of I A 75 
in defining subjective truth as: »objective uncertainty, adhered to in the 
most passionate dedication of intensity [Inderlighed] is the truth, the highest 
truth there is for an existing individual.« (9:l69f; VII, 188-189; Eng., 182). 
A few lines further on he says that this definition of truth amounts also 
to a definition of faith. It may well be that had he known of it SK would 
have approved of Aquinas’ distinction between faith and knowledge as two 
different cognitive states.
Certainly, also in harmony with traditional philosophy, for SK, one of
the chief factors in faith is the will. But SK also explicitly says in Frag­
ments that »... Faith is not an act of the will«; (6:59; IV, 254; Eng., 77). 
The reason for this is that, again in line with traditional Christian teaching, 
SK wants to emphasize that faith is a gift of God. »Unless the God grants 
the condition which makes it possible to understand this, how is it to be 
supposed that the learner will be able to discover it! But that the God him­
self gives this condition has been shown above to be a consequense of the 
Moment, and it has also been shown that the Moment is the Paradox, and 
that without it we are unable to advance, but return to Socrates.« (6:55; 
IV, 250; Eng., 72).
But within a few lines, SK indicates quite clearly that although the im­
pulse from God is a sine qua non, still the individual must dispose himself 
for it and ratify that impulse when it is vouchsafed, so that here the will 
does have an indispensable part. »But how does the learner come to realize 
an understanding with this Paradox? We do not ask that he understand 
the Paradox but only understand that this is the Paradox. How this takes 
place we have already shown. It comes to pass when the Reason and the 
Paradox encounter one another happily in the Moment, when the Reason 
sets itself aside and the Paradox bestows itself.« (6:56; IV, 251; Eng., 72- 
73). For the reason to set itself aside would seem to require a conscious 
decision, an act of the will. SK adds that a third element is involved here: 
reason is set aside, the Paradox bestows itself, and so it must take place in 
something. »The third entity in which this union is realized ... is that happy 
passion ... [called] Faith.« (Ibid.) SK’s stress on faith as a »leap«, casting 
oneself out over »seventy thousand fathoms of water«, in the Postscript 
(9: 170; VII, 189; Eng., 182) also indicates that faith involves an act of 
the will.
It appears then, that for SK, neither divine grace alone nor the act of 
the will alone can bring about faith, but both are required. In this way, 
Kierkegaard reaffirms a traditional Christian view that may have become 
blurred through the rationalistic excesses and apologetical enthusiasms of 
the period between Descartes and Hegel. Several years after the publication 
of the Postscript, in a comment reminiscent of Plotinus, SK notes in his 
Journal: »If you do not have faith, then at least believe that you will indeed 
come to have faith —  and then you do have faith.« (X 3 A 536; J & P, II, 
1141). This entry again indicates that the individual must will to dispose 
himself for the gift of faith.
Kierkegaard had a keen appreciation of the nuances of language. Thus, 
when he refers to faith as a passion, »that happy passion«, etc., he is not 
thinking of faith as a mere emotional state. In the languages he was most 
familiar with (i.e., Danish, German, Latin, and Greek) there is a very 
close relationship between the words for »passion« and for »suffering«. 
Only rarely do we use the word »passion« in this sense in English. Also, 
especially in Greek (jiafieiv) and Latin (pati), the root verb (and its 
derivatives) involves the notion of something done to the subject, i.e., that 
the subject is the recipient of something. The English word »passive« reflects 
this, of course, but all too often suggests that the recipient is totally inert, 
which would be misleading in the present instance. When SK speaks of 
faith as »that happy passion« it is very likely that all of these considerations 
were present in his mind, so that he was aware that faith may indeed involve 
suffering and that it requires that »the learner« put himself as far as possible 
into a state of active readiness to receive the Paradox in the Moment by 
setting Reason aside, but that this is all that »the learner« can do by his 
own will. Faith, if and when it comes, comes as a gift. No human being 
can give it to himself or to anyone else. But when faith does come, not 
only is »the leap« of the will required, but it must be made continuously 
thereafter: »... if I want to preserve myself in the faith, I must constantly 
see to it that I adhere to the objective uncertainty, that in the objective 
uncertainty I am ‘out over seventy thousands fathoms of water’, and yet 
believe.« (Postscript, 9:170; IV, 189-190; Eng. 182).
II Concept of Faith
Kierkegaard does not give us a single unequivocal definition of faith that 
we might conveniently memorize or enshrine in a catechism. Rather, he 
suggests a number of viewpoints which, taken together, give us a richer 
view than any one »objective« definition.
Thus, in an undated entry in his Journal from the same year (1846) he 
published the Postscript, he observes: »Faith is always related to that which
is not seen----in the context af nature (physically contrasted [.sandseligt
modsat']) to the invisible [Usynlige}\ in the spiritual context (spiritually) 
to the improbable [ Usandsynlige]« (VIII A 203; J & P, II, 1119). But 
about two years later he says, in part: »Faith is essentially th is----to hold
fast to possibility ...« (IX A 311; J & P, II, 1126). Faith, then, may be 
regarded as the firm adherence to the possibility of that which (to mere 
reason) is improbable.
After all, what could be more improbable than the promise to Abraham 
and Sarah that they would have a son in their old age, that Abraham should 
sacrifice Isaac and yet he would be the father of a great people? What
could be more improbable than the Incarnation----that God could become
present in time and thus be both eternal and historical? What could be 
more improbable than that the omnipotent God should take on an incognito, 
suffer, die, and rise again after three days in the grave? Yet all these and 
more faith demands.
Kierkegaard does not hesitate to call the principal tenets of Christianity 
absurd, and he challenges those who would like to think of themselves as 
Christians to face up to that and other inconvenient facts squarely. SK is 
fond of quoting Tertullian’s embarrassing dictum: »Credo quia absurdum 
(I believe because it is absurd).« But he is also fond of quoting the principle 
associated with Augustine and Anselm: »Credo ut intelligam (I believe in 
order that I may understand).« His point is again the traditional one: the 
central truths of Christianity are at odds with wordly wisdom, they are an 
offense to intellectual pride, but unless one believes, one can never hope 
to go beyond merely human categories of thought so as to achieve a kind 
of understanding that is, however, not comprehension. Both Augustine and 
Anselm would insist that the understanding that is sought within faith 
does not at all dissolve the mystery (or the paradox) that is immanent in 
faith. The understanding they speak of may involve an illumination or 
elucidation of the paradox so that it may be more clearly and firmly grasped, 
but it remains a mystery or a paradox. In fact, its paradoxical character may 
be even more vividly recognized.
Admittedly, one takes a chance in leaving aside the comfortable and 
familiar criteria of ordinary human reason. »Without risk there is no faith. 
Faith is precisely the contradiction between the infinite passion of intensity 
and the objective uncertainty. If I could grasp God objectively, then I would 
not believe, but precisely because I cannot do that, then I must believe; ...« 
[Postscript, 9:170; VIII, 189; Eng., 182). Faith, like subjective truth, is the 
daring venture of choosing objective uncertainty with the passion of the 
infinite.
But faith (and truth as subjectivity in the nobler and more proper sense 
(sensu eminentiori; cf. 9:172n; VII, 191-92; Eng., 184-85) is not just 
any passionate affirmation in the face of objective uncertainty. Socratic 
ignorance, which did not forget the importance of the existing individual 
and the reality of the eternal, is, in SK’s interpretation, an example of 
subjectivity (and faith) in the wider sense, an »analogy« to faith in the 
stricter sense. Faith in the proper meaning of the term contains some specific­
ally Christian ingredient. In this way, SK makes a distinction between faith 
in a general sense or a secular, but firmly held conviction which may not 
be objectively or scientifically verifiable but which is nevertheless passionately 
affirmed, and faith in the proper sense, religious faith, the prime analogate 
by reference to which the former may be called faith.
Although the leap of faith is an act of the will, it is far from an easy 
thing to accomplish. As Torsten Bohlin has observed, Kierkegaard did not 
achieve faith himself easily, but only after a long struggle (K:s Tro, 39). 
In fact, it appears to be not entirely within the power of the individual to 
bring about the leap of faith. Repetition and Fear and Trembling describe 
two phases, infinite resignation and faith. The biblical figure of Job typifies 
infinite resignation in Repetition, and Abraham exemplifies both resignation 
and faith in Fear and Trembling (FT). The pseudonymous author of FT, 
Johannes de Silentio, cannot understand Abraham. He can praise Abraham, 
he can admire him, »... I bow seven times before his name and seventy 
times before his deed.« (SV, 5:35; III, 98-99; Eng., 47), but he is also 
appalled {ibid). But Johannes de Silentio cannot understand Abraham
(5:36, III, 99; Eng., 4 8 ) ----when he tries to think about Abraham he is
annihilated, despite all his effort he cannot get anywhere, when he »strains 
every muscle« he is at the same instant paralyzed (5:32; III, 95; Eng., 44). 
But throughout FT Abraham is presented as the paradigm of faith. Abraham 
is both a »knight of infinite resignation« and a »knight of faith«, but Johan­
nes de Silentio has been able to go no further than resignation —  he stands 
on the boundary (confinium) between resignation and faith. This is because 
one can by his own powers renounce everything, but this takes all his
strength, and this leaves no strength for making the next movement----
into faith (5:46f; III, 112; Eng., 60). Johannes de Silentio describes Abra­
ham as having done both simultaneously, he makes a »double movement« 
of resignation and faith in the same instant. Abraham did not resign him­
self to the sacrifice of Isaac and then later believe that Isaac would be 
restored to him, but in the very instant of relinquishing Isaac Abraham 
believed he would get Isaac back.
Ill Paradox
Throughout his discussion of the story of Abraham and Isaac in FT, SK 
brings out the paradoxical aspect of faith. God’s promise to Abraham and 
Sarah of a son in their old age is patently absurd to all human reckoning, 
and yet Abraham believed (Genesis, 17-18). Abraham left mere human 
reason and understanding behind, embraced the paradox, and the humanly 
impossible became actual (Genesis 21). »By faith Abraham received the 
promise that in his seed all races would be blessed. Time passed, ... it 
became absurd [urimeligt], Abraham believed ... Then came the fullness of 
time ... He accepted the fulfilment of the promise, he accepted it by faith,
and it came to pass according to the promise and according to his faith----
then there was joy in Abraham’s house, when Sarah became a bride on 
the day of their golden wedding.« (5:19-20; III, 81; Eng. 32-33). But God, 
from the human point of view, does not leave well enough alone. Although 
Abraham has been promised that through Isaac he would be the father of 
a great race of people, now Abraham is commanded to take his only beloved 
son off to the land of Moriah and offer him as a burnt offering -  thereby 
apparently negating the possibility of a great race of descendants (Genesis 
22). »Yet Abraham believed and did not doubt, he believed the absurd 
[det Urimelige].« (5:21; III, 83; Eng. 35) SK is clearly fascinated with 
the story of Abraham and Isaac, as he has his pseudonymous author, Johan­
nes de Silentio, embellish the sparse account in the Bible with several 
alternative versions. While FT provokes consideration of many issues, not 
least the ethical problem of the fact that what Abraham was prepared to 
commit was murder, for our present purposes it is enough to point out 
that the compounded paradox of Abraham and Isaac typifies faith for SK. 
One might be inclined to reflect that there is an additional paradox in the 
fact that SK takes Abraham as the exemplar of faith when it is the Christian 
faith that SK is really concerned about.
In his later discussions of faith SK seems to have dropped the notion of
the double movement, infinite resignation---- faith, but the notion of
paradox remains and grows stronger.
While the entire work Philosophical Fragments may be taken to be 
concerned with the topic of faith in its highest form, viz., the Christian 
faith, and especially the relationship between philosophical idealism and 
Christianity, there are some passages in this work that illuminate in a 
particularly striking way the topic of the present essay.
Ordinary thought, »objective« knowledge, for all its precision and clarity 
and undisputed importance, is rather pedestrian. It does not challenge the 
mind to its limits. Modern thought has perhaps been seduced by Descartes’ 
ideal of clear and distinct knowledge. But SK reminds us that even in the 
realm of purely secular knowledge we encounter paradox, so we should 
not be surprised to find it in the divine. It is not only basically dishonest 
to reject the possible legitimacy of paradox, it is also an unjustifiable a priori 
limitation on the potentialities of human nature which, in SK’s view is also 
paradoxical. Paradox offers the opportunity to complete the striving of 
reason by going beyond reason. As SK puts it: »... one should not think 
slightingly of the paradoxical; for the paradox is the source of the thinker’s 
passion, and the thinker without a paradox is like a lover without feeling: 
a paltry mediocrity. But the highest pitch of every passion is always to will 
its own downfall; and so it is also the supreme passion of the Reason to 
seek a collision, though this collision must in one way or another prove 
its undoing. The supreme paradox of all thought is the attempt to discover 
something that thought cannot think. This passion is at bottom present in 
all thinking,...« (6:38; IV, 230; Eng., 46).
Thus, also, it is futile to attempt to prove that God exists. »For if the 
God does not exist it would of course be impossible to prove it; and if he 
does exist it would be folly to attempt it. For at the very outset, in beginning 
my proof, I would have presupposed it, not as doubtful but as certain ...« 
(6:40; IV, 232-233; Eng., 49). This would, of course, beg the question. 
The best that one can do with this kind of effort is not to prove anything 
»least of all an existence, but merely develop the content of a conception.« 
{Ibid,) This is nothing more than the laudable attempt to explore the 
implications of belief, in the tradition of Augustine & Anselm {credo ut 
intelligam). SK’s comment on Anselm’s famous »ontological« argument 
(X 5 A 120; J & P, I, 20) is very much to the point.
So too with all the essential truths of the Christian faith. Reason is not 
only incompetent to prove them (or disprove them), but reason collides 
with them, and so reason must be left aside.
In every argument bearing on the essential truths of the Christian faith, 
no matter how cleverly the argument is constructed, no matter how tightly 
linked its premises, no matter how formally correct its procedure, there is 
always a gap, even a chasm, between the premises and the conclusion. That 
gulf is traversed only by a leap, a leap into the dark. The premises might 
persuade one to take that leap, but it is still a leap not a logically necessary 
inference. Taking this kind of leap obviously entails taking the chance of 
being wrong: »... when faith resolves to believe it runs the risk of com­
mitting itself to an error, but it nevertheless believes. There is no other 
road to faith; if one wishes to escape risk, it is as if one wanted to know 
with certainty that he can swim before going into the water.« (6:76n; IV, 
25; Eng., 103).
No one has the right »... to make others believe that faith is something 
lowly, or that it is an easy thing, whereas it is the greatest and the hardest.« 
(5:48f; III, 115; Eng.,62).
Yet the man of faith is not necessarily dramatically different from others 
in externals. Johannes de Silentio gives an unforgettable description of how 
ordinary, even bourgeois, the knight of faith may be in external appearance; 
yet he has a rich interior life, and somehow he is able »... absolutely to 
express the sublime in the pedestrian...« (FT 5:37-39; III, 100-104; Eng., 
49-52).
With all his emphasis on leaving reason aside, the absurd, the paradox, 
»the leap«, as central to the faith, it remains an open question as to whether 
SK regarded the Christian faith as irrational, arational, or suprarational. 
Good arguments based on textual evidence can be adduced for each of 
these interpretations. One can argue that the paradoxical ingredients of the 
Christian faith openly clash with reason, and so are incompatible with reason, 
are plainly irrational, i.e., contrary to reason. This position is troublesome 
only for those who hold that reason is the only vehicle and criterion for 
what is intellectually respectable. The difficulty with such a view is that 
there are no rational grounds (without begging the question) for maintaining 
that reason is the exclusive norm and way to knowledge. Secondly, one may 
argue that for SK, faith and reason are mutually exclusive categories, that 
neither has anything to do with the other, i.e., that faith is arational, not 
rational, but not contrary to reason either. Finally, one might argue that SK 
means that faith is suprarational —  reason is competent in certain areas, part­
icularly in »objective« knowledge, but faith, cognition of the most important 
things, goes absolutely beyond the limitations of mere reason. In any of 
these interpretations it is important to recall SK’s role as a corrective, and 
that for all his direct and indirect polemic against Hegel and the speculative 
idealists, he was still to a certain extent inclined to use the terminology and 
thought categories of those he opposed, even though he used it against 
them (cf. KR).
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